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Abstract
Research consistently shows that persons with learning disabilities are more likely to be victims of  crime. For
such victims, engaging with the criminal justice system may be fraught with difficulties given the expectation
that victims should normally articulate verbally and with fluency both their testimony and their views on
issues pertaining to the justice process itself. Grounded in the principle of  orality and often likened to a
system of  gladiatorial combat, adversarial justice systems have a poor track record of  hearing the voices of
victims of  crime who have learning disabilities. However, recent years have witnessed an attitudinal shift
towards meeting the needs of  victims who require communication support; with legal and policy reforms
introduced across multiple jurisdictions designed to enable more effective participation in the justice process.
Augmentative and alternative communication could constitute an important support mechanism to enable
and empower victims of  crime who would struggle to express themselves verbally in the courtroom; yet these
alternative forms of  voice are alien to the oral tradition and sit uneasily within the priority traditionally
afforded to adversarial questioning techniques.
Keywords: victims; witnesses; disabilities; communication; competency; credibility;
augmentative and alternative communication
Introduction
There is a growing corpus of  literature documenting the specific difficulties experiencedby victims with learning disabilities within the criminal process.1 Disabled persons are
at a considerably higher risk of  victimisation generally, and disability hate crime and sexual
offences in particular.2 They are often highly dependent on paid or family caregivers for
assistance in multiple domains including managing personal finances, personal (intimate)
care and social care which may create opportunities for abusers; and people with learning
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1     See e.g. Jessica Jones, ‘Persons with Intellectual Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: Review of  Issues’
(2007) 51 International Journal of  Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 723; Shane Kilcommins
et al, An International Review of  Legal Provisions and Supports for People with Disabilities as Victims of  Crime (Irish
Council of  Civil Liberties 2014); Chih Hoong Sin et al, Disabled People’s Experiences of  Targeted violence and Hostility
(Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009).
2     See e.g. Lisa Jones et al, ‘Prevalence and Risk of  Violence against Children with Disabilities: A Systematic
Review and Meta-analysis of  Observational Studies’ (2012) 380 The Lancet 899; Sue Ralph et al, ‘Disability
Hate Crime: Persecuted for Difference’ (2016) 43(3) British Journal of  Special Education 215. 
disabilities may be less likely to realise the nature of  the offence and/or report it.3 This
article focuses on the issues facing such victims as they are often the only sources of
evidence, though much of  what we argue is equally applicable to non-victim witnesses
(including defendants). Questioning techniques and the stress of  the investigation can
disorientate many witnesses; they may appear to be inarticulate or may make inconsistent
statements. Perceptions that they are incapable of  providing credible evidence or that they
are unlikely to cross the competency threshold (sometimes held by victims themselves)
mean that many complaints are not made, not taken seriously, or fall to the wayside before
they reach court.4
This article explores the participatory barriers facing a specific sub-group of  learning
disabled witnesses, namely those who might be described as ‘non-verbal’ or ‘minimally
verbal’. Until very recently at least, such victims have largely remained invisible to both
researchers and criminal justice professionals.5 At the outset, it is worth clarifying what
these labels mean, given that they are contested terms across different disciplines
(including speech therapy, education studies and psychology).6 For present purposes, we
define a non-verbal witness as one who does not have enough command of  any language
system (oral/spoken, signed or technology-mediated) to deliver verbal evidence fluently
and would require significant communication support such as the provision of  a limited
selection of  picture symbols to indicate meaning and/or the support of  a communication
partner. This is likely to arise from autism, severe learning disabilities (SLD) or profound
and multiple learning disabilities (PMLD) which may stem from an acquired brain injury
or from a genetic, congenital or neurological impairment.7 Our working definition
therefore does not encompass disabled witnesses who have access to a complex language
system which provides a comparable equivalent to oral testimony such as Deaf  witnesses
(since British Sign Language is a language system in its own right) or witnesses with motor
neurone disease and high cognitive functioning who can produce fluent accounts through
an electronic communication device. Rather, our focus is on witnesses who have limited
language (through any medium) and will require significant support including
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3     Juan Bornman et al, ‘Identifying Barriers in the South African Criminal Justice System: Implications for
Individuals with Severe Communication Disability’ (2016) 29 Acta Criminologica 12.
4     Deirdre Brown and Charlie Lewis, ‘Competence is in the Eye of  the Beholder: Perceptions of  Intellectually
Disabled Child Witnesses’ (2013) 60(1) International Journal of  Disability Development and Education 3; Gill
Green, ‘Vulnerability of  Witnesses with Learning Disabilities: Preparing to Give Evidence against a
Perpetrator of  Sexual Abuse’ (2001) 29(3) British Journal of  Learning Disability 103–9; Lucy Henry et al,
‘Perceived Credibility and Eyewitness Testimony of  Children with Intellectual Disabilities’ (2011) 55(4)
Journal of  Intellectual Disability Research 385; Helen Westcott and David Jones, ‘Annotation: The Abuse of
Disabled Children’ (1999) 40 Journal of  Child Psychology and Psychiatry 497. 
5     Notable exceptions are a range of  studies relating to non-verbal participants in the South African criminal
justice system. See Bornman et al (n 3); Diane Bryen and Christopher Wickman, ‘Ending the Silence of  People
with Little or No Functional Speech: Testifying in Court. (2011) 31 Disability Studies Quarterly <http://dsq-
sds.org/article/view/1711 on 30/06/17>; Robyn White et al, ‘Testifying in Court as a Victim of  Crime for
Persons with Little or No Functional Speech: Vocabulary Implications’ (2015) 16 Child Abuse Research in
South Africa 1.
6     Catherine Lord et al, ‘The Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule – Generic: A Standard Measure of  Social
and Communication Deficits Associated with the Spectrum of  Autism’ (2000) 30(3) Journal of  Autism and
Developmental Disorders 205.
7     For instance, approximately 30% of  people with a diagnosis of  autism spectrum disorder are non-verbal or
minimally verbal, with ‘minimally verbal’ denoting no more than 20–30 spoken words: Helen
TagerFlusbergand Connie Kasari, ‘Minimally Verbal School-aged Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder:
The Neglected End of  the Spectrum’ (2013) 6(6) Autism Research 468. Occasionally, some forms of
dementia may also result substantial language loss: Hans Förstl and Alexander Kurz. ‘Clinical Features of
Alzheimer’s Disease’ (1999) 249(6) European Archives of  Psychiatry Clinical Neurosciences 288. 
symbolisation of  words and/or communication partner support so they can access
participatory rights on an equal footing. 
Drawing on recent developments to support vulnerable witnesses in the criminal
process of  England and Wales, we undertake a thematic analysis of  the nature of  these
participatory barriers and how they might be overcome. The most obvious starting point
concerns the question of  communication. Verbal interaction is the norm in most such
settings – and the principle of  orality has long been considered part of  the bedrock of
adversarial trial.8 We aim to explain the various alternative forms of  voice for those who
do not communicate verbally, outlining how Augmentative and Alternative
Communication (AAC) offers an auspicious mechanism that can enable meaningful
interaction using approaches such as picture exchange communication systems (PECS),
Makaton signing, or speech-generating devices (SGDs).9 We analyse some of  the positive
developments that have occurred in relation to facilitating such witnesses and the
opportunities that lie ahead, and the valuable role that intermediaries and aids to
communication can play in facilitating these.
Having highlighted the ways in which voice might be exercised, the second part of  the
article explores the issue of  competency. Some witnesses with severe learning difficulties
will not be deemed capable of  giving intelligible evidence and, as such, will be considered
incompetent to testify. However, recent years have seen a more enlightened approach
from the courts in determining such matters; and many non-verbal witnesses may now be
deemed competent to testify. 
The final part of  the article turns to the issue of  credibility. The evidence of  learning
disabled witnesses has long been viewed through a lens of  suspicion, and as noted above, this
goes some way to explaining the high attrition rate. It is suggested that negative perceptions
of  credibility are further compounded by the use of  an atypical means of  communication
which, when aggravated by the structural deficiencies of  the adversarial model of  proof,
means that justice is often denied for some of  the most vulnerable in society.
Communication
The effectiveness and responsiveness of  the public prosecutions system hinges upon
vulnerable voices being heard and being taken seriously. The question then arises as to how
the ‘best evidence’ of  such witnesses can be best facilitated. Evidently, non-verbal victims
face a unique challenge in this regard since they do not express themselves verbally.
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF VOICE
One possible mechanism that might empower witnesses to interact more effectively with
the criminal justice system is AAC. AAC refers to a burgeoning area of  educational and
clinical practice which aims to provide a range of  communication methods to supplement
or replace a person’s natural speech and which is generally acknowledged to have emerged
as recognised professional specialisation in the 1980s.10 Three of  the most common
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8     Patrick Devlin, The Judge (OUP 1979) 54.
9     Kieron Sheehy and Hester Duffy, ‘Attitudes to Makaton in the Ages on Integration and Inclusion’ (2009) 24(2)
International Journal of  Special Education 91; Sue Roulstone et al, ‘Interventions for Children with Speech,
Language and Communication Needs: An Exploration of  Current Practice’ (2012) 28(3) Child Language
Teaching and Therapy 325.
10   Ralf  Schlosser et al, ‘Speech Output and Speech-generating Devices in Autism Spectrum Disorders’ in Pat
Mirenda and Teresa Iacono (eds), Autism Spectrum Disorders and AAC (Brookes 2009); Carole Zangari et al,
‘Augmentative and Alternative Communication: An Historic Perspective’ (1994) 10(1) Augmentative and
Alternative Communication 27.
methods of  communication support which fall within the umbrella term AAC include
SGDs (also known as voice-output communication aids or VOCAs) which may be
operated by hand or through eye-gaze recognition technology; the use of  symbol/picture
cards; and the use of  simplified manual signing systems designed for people with learning
disabilities such as Makaton which draw upon the vocabulary of  signed languages such as
British Sign Language but which have significantly less grammatical complexity.11
However, a rich diversity of  other methods also exists –including the use of  writing and
drawing, the use of  artefacts such as dolls to re-enact scenarios – and any approach which
aims to facilitate communication by supplementing or replacing natural speech with
alternative mediums may be said to constitute a form of  AAC.
It would be a mistake to think of  ‘AAC users’ as a homogeneous group of  witnesses
as there will be wide variations in a range of  factors, both individual and environmental,
which will subsequently influence their communication output. A useful model for
conceptualising this interplay of  factors is the biopsychosocial model of  disability
recommended by the World Health Organization’s International Classification of  Functioning,
Disability and Health or ICF.12 This biopsychosocial model conceptualises dis/ability as an
emergent property of  the interplay between individual impairment and environmental
barriers and facilitators. According to this model, therefore, the successful facilitation of
testimony by an AAC user would need to take account of  both the user’s individual
characteristics and the extent of  environmental communication barriers and facilitators.
Individual variables might include: level of  cognitive functioning; degree of  mastery of
chosen communication mediums; level of  physical independence in operating AAC; level
of  social/emotional support and encouragement required; and psychological factors such
as the individual’s degree of  confidence and motivation in using AAC generally, as well as
their level of  resilience to the stress of  giving evidence. Environmental factors (in the
immediate courtroom context) might include: the experience and knowledge of  the
intermediary appointed to support the user; the suitability of  the AAC provision which is
put in place; the extent and limitations of  the vocabulary set provided by that AAC; and
the degree to which the person’s needs are effectively identified and met in relation to
issues such as clear questioning techniques and minimisation of  sensory distractions.
Finally, more distal environmental factors come into play such as the witness’s prior
experience of  AAC through education settings and/or speech and language therapy
services. A witness who has their own familiar and well-established AAC system (whether
that be embedded and extensive knowledge of  Makaton signing or their own SGD in
everyday usage) has the advantage over a witness who has only recently been introduced
to AAC as part of  the evidence-giving process; and a witness who is already familiar with
sign or symbol vocabulary sets relevant to (for example) sexual abuse such as private body
parts will be further advantaged. This complex interplay of  factors will produce a diverse
range of  AAC users, from those who can convey basic short messages such as yes/no or
1–2 word phrases to users who can rapidly and confidently combine symbols or signs to
answer a range of  questions.
It is important to clarify the distinction between AAC and facilitated communication
(FC). FC is a controversial technique which involves a facilitator supporting a person to
spell out messages on an alphabet board through any combination of  physical support to
the person’s arm or hand; verbal prompts and moral support, often producing startling
outcomes of  fluent, highly literate communication where communication ability of  this
level had not been evidenced previously. FC has a controversial history in the courtroom,
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11   Roulstone et al (n 9); Sheehy and Duffy (n 9).
12   World Health Organization, International Classification of  Functioning, Disability and Health, res 54.21 (2001).
having been implicated in multiple instances of  sexual abuse allegations which were
subsequently found to be untrue, with authorship suspected to lie with the facilitator.13
FC is not accepted as a legitimate AAC intervention by the International Society for
Augmentative and Alternative Communication,14 and its troubling courtroom history
makes it worthy of  mention for two reasons: firstly, to raise awareness of  the possibility
that jury perceptions of  ‘validity’ and ‘authorship’ of  AAC-mediated evidence more
generally may be compromised by the history of  FC in particular; and secondly to
highlight the need for further unpacking of  the different dimensions of  support offered
by intermediaries (social, emotional, organisational, communicative, physical) and the
implications of  these for perceived validity and authorship. These questions are discussed
further below.
The technologies outlined above have undoubtedly empowered voices that have long
gone unheard in a range of  social settings. While the use of  these technologies is relatively
novel within criminal justice, and there are few reported cases on their use in legal
settings,15 there is a growing body of  evidence that such aids are becoming much more
commonplace.16 The evidence gathered within other social settings suggests that, if
properly used, AAC holds the potential to empower non-verbal victims through reducing
levels of  stress and facilitating them to give best evidence. 
FACILITATING COMMUNICATION
The main statutory framework that assists non-verbal victims is contained in Part II of
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA).17 Under s 16, any witness
whose quality of  evidence is likely to be diminished because, inter alia, they have a
significant impairment of  intelligence and social functioning is presumed to be eligible for
a special measures direction. The court must satisfy itself  that the special measure or
combination of  special measures is likely to improve the quality of  the witness’s evidence
in terms of  ‘completeness, coherence and accuracy’.18 In total, eight such measures are
set out in ss 23 to 30 of  the Act. Ordinarily, witnesses with learning disabilities may expect
to receive the benefit of  pre-recorded evidence and the use of  a televised link for the
purposes of  cross-examination in chief,19 and advocates and judges may remove wigs and
gowns.20 Often, measures such as removal of  wigs and gowns and the use of  a live link
or pre-recorded examination-in-chief  are unlikely to be particularly contentious. One of
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13   See, generally, John Jacobson et al, ‘A History of  Facilitated Communication: Science, Pseudoscience, and
Antiscience Science Working Group on Facilitated Communication’ (1995) 50(9) American Psychologist 750;
Jason Travers et al, ‘Facilitated Communication Denies People with Disabilities their Voice’ (2014) 39(3)
Research and Practice for  Persons with Severe Disabilities 195.
14   Susan Balandin, ‘ISAAC Position Statement on Facilitated Communication’ (2014) 30(4) Augmentative and
Alternative Communication 357.
15   An exception can be located in R v Watts [2010] EWCA Crim 1924, where one witness was entirely incapable
of  speech or any other form of  communication and where evidence from one non-verbal witness was
facilitated through eye gaze technology and an electronic communication device. Her ABE interview was
admitted under s 116(2) Criminal Justice Act 2003 as an exception to the hearsay rule.
16    See, generally, Joyce Plotnikoff  and Richard Woolfson, Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System (Policy Press 2015). 
17   Special measures are not, however, available to defendants. A live link may be made available in certain
circumstances under YJCEA, s 33A. Intermediaries may also be used in ‘rare’ cases for defendants: Criminal
Practice Directions (Crim PD) (Amendment No 1) [2016] EWCA Crim 97. See further Laura Hoyano and
Angela Rafferty, ‘Rationing Defence Intermediaries under the April 2016 Criminal Practice Direction’ (2017)
Criminal Law Review 93.
18   YJCEA, ss 16(5) and 19(2).
19   Ibid ss 27 and 24 respectively.
20   Ibid s 26.
the most radical measures is contained in s 28 of  the YJCEA, which provides for the
cross-examination and re-examination of  the witness in advance of  the trial. Receipt of
the entire testimony of  a vulnerable witness outside the formal courtroom environment
in advance of  the trial clearly holds the potential to significantly reduce fear and
apprehension and to allow the witness to achieve some sense of  closure within a relatively
short time frame after the offence. However – citing concerns among the profession
about its practical operation – the government declined to implement this provision when
most of  the other special measures came into force in July 2002. A pilot programme was
eventually trialled at three Crown Court Centres at the end of  2013, but at the time of
writing the prospect of  national implementation remains uncertain. In terms of  specific
support for non-verbal witnesses that are currently available, two key provisions merit
further consideration. Sections 29 and 30 provide for the use of  intermediaries and the
use of  aids to communication respectively. 
Intermediaries
Under s 29 of  the Act, a court may order that an eligible witness may be examined
through an independent intermediary in order to communicate:
. . . questions put to the witness, and to any persons asking such questions, the
answers given by the witness in reply to them, and to explain such questions or
answers so far as necessary to empowered them to be understood by the witness
or person in question.21
Designed to assist witnesses with severe communication difficulties, intermediaries were
first piloted in 2004, before a phased national roll-out began in 2008. The scheme has
since made a significant impact on access to justice in cases which would never have
previously gone to trial.22
Ordinarily, a non-verbal victim should be identified at an early stage in the
investigative process,23 and at this stage the Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) process is
triggered.24 The police and other criminal justice agencies should adhere to best practice
guidelines laid down in respect of  interviewing and questioning techniques to ensure that
vulnerable witnesses are empowered to give their ‘best’ evidence. A registered
intermediary, selected from a range of  professionals with various skills sets, will then be
matched with the witness by the National Crime Agency to assess the witness and make
recommendations to various criminal justice personnel (such as police officers, advocates,
judges and magistrates, Witness Service and court personnel) as to how the witness
should be questioned.25 In many cases, this results in a video-recorded interview being
used to substitute the child’s live evidence-in-chief  in court.26
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21   YJCEA, s 29(2).
22   One evaluation estimated that more than half  of  cases evaluated would not have reached court without
intermediary involvement: Joyce Plotnikoff  and Richard Woolfson, The ‘Go-between’: Evaluation of  Intermediary
Pathfinder Projects (Ministry of  Justice 2007).
23   In other cases, certain disabilities or other forms of  vulnerability may not be so readily apparent. See further
Brendan O’Mahony et al, ‘The Early Identification of  Vulnerable Witnesses Prior to an Investigative
Interview’ (2011) 13 British Journal of  Forensic Practice 114.
24   Ministry of  Justice, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings (Ministry of  Justice 2011).
25   Penny Cooper and Michelle Mattinson, ‘Intermediaries, Vulnerable People and the Quality of  Evidence: An
International Comparison of  Three Versions of  the English Intermediary Model’ (2017) 21(4) 4 International
Journal of  Evidence and Proof  351; Plotnikoff  and Woolfson (n 16).
26   Becky Milne and Ray Bull, ‘Interviewing Victims of  Crime, including Children and People with Intellectual
Disabilities’ in Mark R Kebbell and Graham Davies, Practical Psychology for Forensic Investigations and Prosecutions
(John Wiley 2006).
The initial assessment of  a non-verbal victim by an intermediary should analyse the
communicative capacities of  the person concerned. This process can thus be used to
identify users of  AAC, the type of  AAC technology relied upon, and the understanding,
fluency and skill level of  the user. This varies considerably from individual to individual.
The intermediary is tasked with making ‘recommendations as to special measures to
enable the best communication’,27 and the report should detail the ability and fluency of
the AAC user and recommendations on what form of  questions should be put to the
witness.28 Often, questioners will be advised of  ways to explain basic ground rules to
witnesses such as ‘Don’t guess’ or ‘Tell the truth’.29 Although ABE interviews generally
place emphasis on the need for free narrative, witnesses with learning difficulties may
often require more structured and closed questions as many are reluctant to respond to
open invitations.30 These recommendations will then be communicated to criminal justice
professionals to inform decision-making about whether, and if  so how, the investigation
should proceed and a trial should be held. Where a case proceeds to trial, intermediaries
will often attend a familiarisation visit with the witness and sit with the witness
throughout proceedings. They are expected to monitor questioning and ‘actively to
intervene when miscommunication may or is likely to have occurred or to be occurring’
(though their primary duty is to the court).31
Evidently, this represents a radical departure from the archetypal adversarial duel and
‘vigorous and polarized’ debates have taken place on intermediaries since they were first
proposed by the Pigot Committee in 1989.32 Concerns have been expressed that the
filtering of  questioning could result in the loss of  meaning, intonation and emphasis
leading to questions as to how effective a defence the accused is able to mount in these
circumstances.33 It also represents a threat to the long-standing principle of  party control
of  evidence,34 and whether they are sufficiently equipped to identify and object to
inappropriate lines of  questioning.35 The risk of  intermediaries ‘overreaching’ their role
was addressed by the Court of  Appeal in R v Christian,36 where an intermediary put her
arm around a witness when she became distressed, comforted her during her cross-
examination, and asked counsel to moderate the tone of  her voice. The judge instructed
the jury not to allow sympathy for the complainant as a person to cloud their judgement
of  her as a witness. The appellant’s concern that these actions interfered with the
defendant’s right to a fair hearing was dismissed; with the court stating that the question
was not whether the intermediary had overstepped her proper role, but whether there was
any serious risk of  unfairness. Given the judicial direction, there was no sensible prospect
of  unfairness in the current case. 
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27   Ministry of  Justice, Registered Intermediary Procedural Guidance Manual (Ministry of  Justice 2012).
28   The report may cover other issues, such as how a witness might best be supported emotionally: Michelle
Mattinson, ‘Putting Theory into Practice: A Comparison of  the Guidance Available to Investigative
Interviewers and Advocates when using Communication Aids in the Criminal Justice System’ in Penny Cooper
and Linda Hunting (eds), Addressing Vulnerability in Justice Systems (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill 2016).
29   Cooper and Mattinson (n 25); Plotnikoff  and Woolfson (n 16) 88. 
30   Plotnikoff  and Woolfson (n 16) 90–1.
31   R v Cox [2012] 2 Cr App R 6, [28].
32   Lauran Hoyano and Caroline Keenan, Child Abuse Law and Policy across Boundaries (2007 OUP) 663.
33   Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of  Third Parties (Hart 2008).
34   Emily Henderson ‘“A Very Valuable Tool” Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries Discuss the Intermediary
System in England and Wales’ (2015)19(3) International Journal of  Evidence and Proof  154.
35   Laura Hoyano, ‘Reforming the Adversarial Trial for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants’ (2015) Criminal
Law Reform 105.
36   [2015] EWCA Crim 1582.
There are grounds for optimism in that many advocates now recognise that
intermediaries can make a valuable contribution to decision-making processes,
particularly concerning which cases to pursue and specific strategies that could be
adopted to prevent miscommunication at trial.37 Interviews conducted with judges and
advocates as part of  a study by Emily Henderson in 2013 found widespread ‘enthusiasm
and warmth’ for intermediaries, and that widespread fears over resistance from the
profession had not materialised.38 Other studies have arrived at similar conclusions, and
law reform bodies across the globe have also looked to the English model.39 While
concerns remain that some advocates continue to hold reservations or lack the specialist
knowledge that would enable them to conduct appropriate questioning,40 ongoing
education and training may be capable of  addressing this issue.41
Aids to communication
The use of  an intermediary alone is unlikely to facilitate the evidence of  non-verbal
witnesses. In addition, such witnesses are likely to need the assistance of  some form of
AAC to express themselves. To this end, s 30 of  the Act provides that the court may
direct that a witness is permitted to use an ‘aid to communication’; intermediaries will
recommend which aids might improve communication on the basis of  the individual
needs of  the witness. Aids to communication may thus not only enhance the quality of
evidence, but may also reduce stress levels of  the user.42 Oddly, no definition of  what
might constitute such an aid is provided in the legislation itself; anything deemed
appropriate to the court is permissible although both the Equal Treatment Bench Book and
the Criminal Procedure Rules (Crim PR) 2015 refer to an array of  tools such as pictures,
plans, symbols, dolls, figures, models, body maps and similar aids.43
On a practical level, however, concerns have been expressed that advocates and
judges, in particular, are unfamiliar with the range of  aids available and their potential to
empower witnesses who lack verbal skills. There are some positive indications, however,
that levels of  understanding are improving. The Inns of  Court College of  Advocacy
(formerly the Advocacy Training Council) has developed an online portal, The Advocate’s
Gateway, which is designed to offer evidence-based guidance to advocates, police officers,
social workers, solicitors, guardians and judges who may encounter vulnerable witnesses
or defendants at some point in their journey through the criminal justice system.44
Seventeen separate ‘toolkits’ are available and Toolkit 14: Using Communication Aids in the
Criminal Justice System, is one of  the few guidelines for advocates that make express
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37   Joyce Plotnikoff  and Richard Woolfson, ‘Making Best Use of  the Intermediary Special Measure’ (2008)
Criminal Law Reform 91.
38   Henderson (n 34) 168.
39   Cooper and Mattinson (n 25); Kirsten Hanna et al, Child Witnesses in the New Zealand Criminal Courts: a Review
of  Practice and Implications for Policy (NZ Law Foundation 2010); Plotnikoff  and Woolfson (n 22); Jana Robinson
‘The Experience of  the Child Witness: Legal and Psychological Issues’ (2015) 42 International Journal of  Law
and Psychiatry 168; Mary Woodward et al, ‘Out of  the Mouth of  Babes: Enabling Children to Give Evidence
in the Justice System’ (2014) 39(1) Alternative Law Journal 27.
40   Henderson (n 34).
41   See below, p 461.
42   Plotnikoff  and Woolfson (n 16), 69.
43   Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book (Judicial College 2013); CPR 2015, r 3.9(7)(vi).
44   See further Mattinson (n 28).
reference to the use of  high-tech and low-tech forms of  AAC outlined above.45 In
addition to providing a lucid and informed outline of  many of  the forms of  AAC,
Toolkit 14 emphasises the importance of  the role of  the intermediary in assessing the
verbal limitations or idiosyncratic speech patterns of  a learning disabled witness and
recommends a mixture of  tools and strategies that might best facilitate the evidence of
an individual witness. 
The YJCEA has created a framework whereby evidence is much more likely to be
received from non-verbal witnesses providing the competency test is met. Yet
notwithstanding the introduction of  special measures and greater numbers of  witnesses
with communication difficulties now being deemed competent to testify, fears have been
expressed that ‘the intimidatory and intrusive antics employed daily by defence lawyers in
a range of  contexts have escaped examination’.46 The onus then falls on the trial judge to
militate against such tactics.47
Judicial control
Under the adversarial paradigm, judges have long been expected to exercise an ‘umpireal’
role and as such have been reticent to intervene to prevent oppressive advocacy lest s/he
be seen as ‘descending from Avernus’,48 and ‘entering the arena’ in favour of  one side or
the other.49 Indeed, empirical research confirms judicial intervention to prevent excessive
cross-examination of  vulnerable parties has been relatively rare,50 although this may be
partly attributable to the fact that until recently many have lacked the necessary
knowledge about the needs of  learning disabled witnesses in order to do so.51
Yet, in more recent times, it seems that the judiciary are rising admirably to this
challenge, with the courts increasingly underlining the need for trial judges to take
proactive steps to control the nature and substance of  cross-examination. This
metamorphosis of  the judicial role has been spearheaded by the Court of  Appeal in a line
of  decisions since 2011, and the court has made clear that it is incumbent on advocates
to adapt their questioning so that it reflects the developmental needs of  the witness.52 In
Barker53 it was stressed that advocates should adapt their ‘forensic techniques’ in order to
enable best evidence. This should entail the use of  ‘short, simple questions which put the
Non-verbal victims in the adversarial criminal process 459
45   The Advocates Gateway, Toolkit 14: Understanding Communication Aids in the Criminal Justice System (Council of
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46   Louise Ellison, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness (OUP 2001) 125.
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Credibility: A Comparison of  Judgements by Individuals and Mock Juries’ (2007) 21(9) Applied Cognitive
Psychology 1145.
48   Sean Doran, ‘Descent to Avernus’ (1989) 139 New Law Journal 1147.
49   See comments of  Stuart-Smith LJ in R v Sharp [1993] 3 All ER 225, 231.
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essential elements of  the defendant’s case to the witness’, with any comment on
credibility following after the testimony has concluded.54 Likewise, in E,55 it was stated
that steps taken by trial judges to place limits on cross-examination would not ordinarily
undermine the accused’s right to a fair trial. Underlining the importance of  the principle
of  equality of  voice in Cox,56 Lord Judge CJ outlined the duty on trial judges to adapt
proceedings to ensure that those with disabilities were not placed at a disadvantage:
[A]s part of  their general responsibilities judges are expected to deal with specific
communication problems faced by any defendant or any individual witness . . . as
part and parcel of  their ordinary control of  the judicial process. When necessary,
the processes have to be adapted to ensure that a particular individual is not
disadvantaged as a result of  personal difficulties, whatever form they may take.57
More recently, it was held in Lubemba that trial judges are under a duty to intervene where
cross-examination is confusing or inappropriate, and should set reasonable time limits.58
Moreover. this line of  reasoning is reflected in the Lord Chief  Justice’s Criminal Practice
Direction 2015 which provides:
The judiciary is responsible for controlling questioning. Over-rigorous or
repetitive cross-examination of  a child or vulnerable witness should be stopped.
Intervention by the judge, magistrates or intermediary (if  any) is minimised if
questioning, taking account of  the individual’s communication needs, is
discussed in advance and ground rules are agreed and adhered to.59
In practice, such limits on cross-examination are enforced through ground rules hearings
(GRHs) which should be held before a child witness or any other witness with special
communication needs gives evidence. Such hearings are mandatory in all cases involving
intermediaries and recommended in others.60 The GRH should determine the nature and
form of  questioning that should be used where a vulnerable witness is cross-examined. A
range of  issues may be considered, including: the need to avoid repetitive questioning;
controlling comment and accusations of  lying; time limits on cross-examination; the type
of  vocabulary used in questioning; and the practicalities surrounding any intervention by
the intermediary.61
While the powers and mechanisms to control the excesses of  cross-examination have
certainly been bolstered, scepticism has been expressed – often with good reason – that
the working cultures of  the legal profession and embedded practices of  the adversarial
tradition often stymie the reach of  well-intentioned reform.62 Ultimately, the success or
failure of  these changes hangs upon the extent to which practitioners, and in particular
the judiciary, are prepared to embrace such a radical culture change; robust judicial case
management is undoubtedly required to ensure that advocates understand and comply
with legal and policy expectations. Somewhat disconcertingly, the track record of
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advocates (and to a lesser extent, judges) in embracing such reforms aimed at improving
the experiences of  vulnerable witnesses is not particularly encouraging.63
Given that AAC constitutes such a radical departure from the emphasis that has
traditionally been placed on ebb and flow of  adversarial advocacy, there may be good
reason to question whether it might ever become embedded as a norm of
communication. That said, there is evidence that attitudes are shifting. In a qualitative
study in 2013 involving interviews with criminal advocates experienced in sex cases,
Henderson found ‘a more sophisticated understanding of  the language issues’ than that
of  advocates interviewed 15 years previously,64 and also found a genuine desire to
improve practice and adopt innovation even where this conflicted with embedded
traditions. Despite these positive overtones, the research concluded that the majority of
cross-examiners lack the skills and specialist training to cross-examine vulnerable
witnesses.65 Other studies have arrived at similar conclusions,66 and have also identified
a lack of  understanding by other criminal justice professionals.67 Evidently, without such
training many advocates would be ill-placed to know what constitutes an inappropriate
question or how to elicit comprehensible responses from a non-verbal witness. 
Competency 
Of  course, the AAC technologies discussed above will only be of  value where a witness
is deemed competent to testify. Historically, there has been significant suspicion around
the evidence of  those with communication difficulties;68 only a few decades ago strict
exclusionary principles were applied in relation to the testimony of  children69 or those
living with a mental illness.70 Section 53 of  the YJCEA provides for a presumption of
competency in respect of  all witnesses though this is rebuttable where a party can show
that a witness is unable to understand questions or give answers that cannot be
understood.71 Whilst a learning disability involving a severe language impairment may not
in itself  preclude a witness from testifying, it could provide grounds for one party to
query competence, in which case the party calling the witness is required to prove that
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s/he is able to communicate intelligibly on the balance of  probabilities.72 In practice, any
issues around competency of  a witness will be identified at an early stage in the process,
and the court may question the witness, consider expert evidence, and evaluate extracts
from the recording of  the ABE interview as part of  any competency hearing. Any
determination reached at that point in the process may be revisited by the trial judge after
cross-examination.73
In recent times the higher courts have made clear that testimony ought to be received
where possible, even if  this would involve a radical departure from the traditional oral
hearing. In R v Watts,74 the complainant had cerebral palsy and was only capable of
uttering a few limited words. As the Court of  Appeal noted, the parliamentary intention
underpinning the 1999 Act is that those who are competent to give evidence should be
assisted to do so.75 The court has also stressed that fulfilment of  the competency
requirement does not hinge upon the ability of  the witness to offer detailed or intelligible
replies to all questions; rather the court should look to form an overall impression.76 This
view was echoed in Barker,77 where the court drew an important distinction between
competency and credibility. While the former was a question of  intelligibility, the latter
was a question of  weight for the jury.78 Thus, there should be no ‘implicit stigma’ relating
to child witnesses, and nor should children be regarded as inherently less reliable. For
Hallet LJ, it is essentially reduced to the principle of  equal access to justice:
The purpose of  the trial process is to identify the evidence which is reliable and
that which is not, whether it comes from an adult or a child. If  competent, as
defined by the statutory criteria, in the context of  credibility in the forensic
process, the child witness starts off  on the basis of  equality with every other
witness. In trial by jury, his or her credibility is to be assessed by the jury, taking
into account every specific personal characteristic which may bear on the issue
of  credibility, along with the rest of  the available evidence.79
Although these remarks were made in the context of  child witnesses, it is evident that
they also apply to witnesses with learning disabilities: 
These statutory provisions are not limited to the evidence of  children. They
apply to individuals of  unsound mind. They apply to the infirm. The question in
each case is whether the individual witness, or, as in this case, the individual child,
is competent to give evidence in the particular trial.80
Moreover, whilst factors such as age and the nature and extent of  any learning disability
ought to be taken into account, these should not be determinative and the ultimate
question for the court to determine is whether the evidence as a whole is intelligible:
The question is entirely witness or child specific. There are no presumptions or
preconceptions. The witness need not understand the special importance that the truth
should be told in court, and the witness need not understand every single question or give
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a readily understood answer to every question. Many competent adult witnesses would fail
such a competency test. Dealing with it broadly and fairly, provided the witness can
understand the questions put to him and can also provide understandable answers, he or
she is competent.81
The rules introduced by the 1999 Act governing the competency of  witnesses are of
symbolic, as well as practical, importance. As Spencer notes:
[T]he rules ‘mark the final transition from a system where the courts refused to
hear all sorts of  persons for fear they might not tell the truth, to one where the
courts listen to everybody, and try to decide whether they are truthful or not on
the basis of  what they have said’.82
The judicial plasticity regarding the competency requirements has enabled many more
witnesses with learning disabilities, including non-verbal victims, to give evidence in
recent years. It is also consistent with psychological evidence regarding the capacity of
learning disabled witnesses to give reliable evidence. Providing the witness is equipped
with the correct tools to understand questions and give intelligible answers, there are no
grounds for a blanket policy exclusion.83 Even where witnesses are deemed not to be
competent, potentially, a hearsay statement may be admitted where the court deems that
the interests of  justice require it84 (competency is not a precondition in such instances).85
However, even where many non-verbal witnesses are considered competent, fears around
how juries will perceive the credibility of  such witnesses impede the prospects of  many
such cases reaching trial and there is evidence to suggest that the Crown Prosecution
Service has traditionally exercised caution in proceeding.86 In the section below, we seek
to unpick some of  the reasons why their testimonies are often viewed as suspect.
Credibility: a problem of perception
Manifestations of  learning disabilities – mostly around communication and social
function – sometimes result in certain witnesses being perceived as less credible or
reliable. In particular, non-verbal individuals with autism may exhibit atypical forms of
behaviour in stressful environments such as poorly modulated eye contact, unusual body
movements (e.g. rocking, hand-flapping or clapping), hesitation in answering questions
and odd vocal responses (e.g. echolalia or random sounds). These may negatively affect
how a non-verbal witness is perceived by both criminal justice professionals (such as
police officers, prosecutors, advocates or intermediaries) and, where the case proceeds to
trial, the judge and jury.87
Such cues may give the impression that a witness is being deceptive, less sincere, or
uncertain of  the facts, though this erroneous and widely held assumption has been
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comprehensively rebutted by psychological research.88 Even if  the prosecution believes
that the witness is likely to pass the competency threshold, the prosecution may still not
proceed if  it is determined that the likelihood of  a conviction is reduced by how the
witness may perform in court.
The secrecy surrounding jury deliberations means that it is difficult to discern the
impact of  certain idiosyncratic behaviours on jury decision-making.89 However, research
based around mock juries, as well as evidence from other jurisdictions, suggests there is
strong evidence that witnesses with learning disabilities are less likely to be believed in
giving evidence (although there is no specific existent research on perceptions of  AAC
users).90 Various ‘testimonial factors’ are said to affect credibility, such as perception,
memory, communication and sincerity;91 and even others that have clearly no relevance
whatsoever, such as ‘attractiveness’, have been documented as factors taken into account.92
However, it has been established that although those with learning difficulties may recall
less detail in response to open-ended questions than neurotypical witnesses,93 the accuracy
of  their recall is generally high although their answers may be perceived as vague or
confused.94 Henry et al found that many mock jurors noted how they appeared to be
distracted or disinterested.95 Overall, there seems to be a discrepancy between the ability
of  such witnesses to offer accurate testimony and jurors’ perceptions of  their ability.96
Learning disabled witnesses are also much more likely to be open to suggestion when
questioned by authority figures in unfamiliar environments.97 In turn, they are more likely
to acquiesce and provide the answer that they believe the questioner is seeking as opposed
to attempting accurate recall.98 Or they may simply comply in order to escape the
confines of  a stressful setting.99 These risks are particularly pertinent at both the
investigative and trial stages of  the criminal process, where evidence confirms that high
stress levels, coupled with inappropriate questioning techniques, may negatively affect the
ability of  vulnerable witnesses to recall past events accurately.100 Stereotyping and biases
against AAC users may be even more prominent given that there appears to be a
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correlation between perceived maturity and credibility.101 In other words, the sharp
contrast between the communicative style of  a learning disabled AAC user against the
expectation of  how a neurotypical witness of  the same age should communicate might
further undermine credibility.
In addition, these erroneous indicators of  credibility are often exacerbated by the
impact of  trauma which by itself  may negatively impact upon memory recall and be
wrongly interpreted as an indicator of  mendacity.102 As Ellison and Munro highlight,
trauma victims often live with fragmented memories, lacking in specific detail and framed
without a linear narrative.103 As the impact of  trauma on memory recall is not widely
known, the authors contend that jurors ought to be provided with this information in
order to inform their decision making.104
A further dimension of  credibility turns on how the presence of  an intermediary
and/or AAC provision could influence the court’s perception of  the ‘validity’ and
‘authorship’ of  the evidence. By ‘validity’, we refer to the extent to which the expressed
message is deemed to reflect what the witness wished to convey to the court; and by
‘authorship’ we refer to the extent to which the expressed message is deemed to have
been constructed by the witness themselves. With regard to validity, questions might arise
around the size of  the symbol/signed vocabulary set used by the witness and whether
limited vocabulary might give rise to approximated and misleading meanings (for
instance, the verb ‘touch’ has a plethora of  related verbs such as ‘grab’ and ‘caress’ with
very different connotations of  intensity, intention and reciprocity). Similarly, given the
unfortunate history of  FC in the courtroom,105 combined with the clearly visible support
from an intermediary and/or communication device, questions could arise about the
extent to which the witness independently authored the AAC-mediated message of  their
own volition. Toolkit 14 does not explicitly address this issue in its advice to
intermediaries, seemingly working on the assumption that the witness will physically
produce their own communication output through (for example) signing or independent
manual operating of  a device; and that the various elements of  intermediary ‘good
practice’ recommended, such as pointing to timelines or translating unclear speech for the
court, will not compromise perceptions of  ‘authorship’ in any way. 
We are conscious that even discussing the very concepts of  ‘validity’ and ‘authorship’
of  AAC-mediated evidence runs the risk of  what Ashby describes as the ‘othering’ that
takes place when a particular (disabled) group is made the subject of  special scrutiny in a
way that non-disabled people are not.106 This concern is relevant in the current context:
we would argue that AAC users are not categorically different from verbal witnesses
whose oral ‘validity’ or ‘authorship’ might be compromised by any number of  factors,
including limited vocabulary; low educational level; susceptibility to stress; or
acquiescence to the suggestions of  an aggressive cross-examiner. On this basis, ‘validity’
and ‘authorship’ concerns should thus be dealt with on an ad hoc basis rather than in the
form of  presumptions about whole categories of  witnesses. At the same time, it seems
preferable to explicitly acknowledge that AAC may give rise to particular concerns around
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‘validity’ and ‘authorship’ in the minds of  jurors, advocates and others who are unfamiliar
with its usage, rather than leaving this as a dangerous unconscious prejudice. Further,
theoretical unpacking of  this issue may be necessary to explore (for example) whether
providing jurors with reports on an AAC user’s typical communicative style and repertoire
would help to challenge unfounded assumptions on the basis of  appearances and
encourage rational, conscious evaluation of  likely validity and authorship; or alternatively
further stigmatise AAC users by problematising issues which are not generally raised in
the case of  speaking witnesses.
Yet, as suggested above, the greatest single barrier to the issue of  credibility is located
within the confines of  the adversarial paradigm itself. The belief  in the primacy afforded
to oral evidence has informed the evolution of  the rules of  criminal procedure and
evidence for centuries.107 There is something of  an inbuilt perception that oral forms of
evidence are superior to other forms (such as written evidence or ‘real’ evidence); thus
adversarial proceedings have placed a strong emphasis on the proper use of  articulate and
detailed oral accounts that can be readily challenged through cross-examination in court.
Accounts that appear confused, disjointed and inarticulate are portrayed as
untrustworthy; little allowance has been afforded to pertinent questions posed by
psychologists around the reliability of  memory or the capacity for factual recall under
stress. At every stage of  the criminal process there is an inherent assumption that
participants are verbally equipped to report offences, explain their actions, and answer
questions to aid the investigative and trial processes.
It is well documented that the nature of  the adversarial trial is a source of  secondary
victimisation for many victims and witnesses,108 but the sequelae are significantly
exacerbated among those who live with learning difficulties, some of  whom will have
minimal understanding of  its nature and function.109 In particular, the convoluted and
unfamiliar language of  the courtroom, coupled with the use of  forensically tuned
linguistic devices adopted by cross-examiners, have been widely decried as mechanisms
which are deliberately used to confuse and disorientate vulnerable witnesses.110 While the
introduction of  special measures and a more robust judicial stance on controlling of
cross-examination have served to militate against some of  the worst excesses of  the
adversarial trial, its structural orientation as an oral duel between prosecution and defence
continues to discriminate against those least able to participate within this paradigm.
ADDRESSING THE CREDIBILITY DEFICIT
Two suggestions can be made in addressing issues pertaining to credibility. First, the wider
use of  expert evidence (particularly that of  a psychologist or psychiatrist) may militate
against negative perceptions of  credibility and reliability. In particular, it could be used to
explain that some of  the manifestations of  disability outlined do not equate to an inability
to provide truthful and accurate evidence.111
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Unfortunately, there is a longstanding rule that expert evidence pertaining to issues of
credibility is generally inadmissible.112 Thus, in R v Robinson113 the Court of  Appeal held
that the prosecution should not have been permitted to recall a psychologist to give
evidence as to whether or not the complainant was suggestible and liable to fantasise;
exceptions to the rule in Toohey only applied where the prosecution sought to pre-empt or
rebut any suggestion by the defence that the evidence should be disregarded due to
mental abnormality. On these grounds, Robinson was distinguished in R v S (VJ),114 where
the appellant had been convicted of  a range of  sexual offences against a 13-year-old girl
who had autism. A paediatrician gave evidence that the demeanour of  the complainant in
a video interview was not unusual for someone with autism, and, in general, autistic
people would be highly unlikely to invent such a story and retain it in their memory. The
appellant contended that this evidence was essentially an effort to boost credibility and,
as such, should have been excluded. The appeal, however, was rejected on the grounds
that the evidence was of  generic application since it was a trait common to all people
living with autism and did not pertain to the specific capabilities of  a particular witness. 
Although the clarification of  the law in S may assist non-verbal victims who live with
a clinical label, this is not always the case and non-verbalism may be attributable to an
unidentified or undiagnosed condition.115 The broader rule (i.e. prohibiting expert
evidence of  issues of  credibility of  a specific witness) has been roundly criticised on the
grounds that ‘the questions which it is important for a jury to decide for itself  may be the
very questions on which it most needs expert advice if  it is to avoid serious injustice’.116
There appears to be a compelling case for reform; expert evidence is widely used to such
ends in others jurisdictions117 and it seems intuitively odd to adopt a stance whereby
experts are unable to tailor their evidence to reflect the particular difficulties of  individual
witnesses.
An alternative (or additional) solution may lie in trial judges providing the jury with
some direction on these matters. While judicial warnings have long been commonplace
on matters such as suspect identification, delays in making sexual complaints, accomplice
evidence, histories of  false allegations and previous convictions, there is little evidence
that they are issued regularly in respect of  issues pertaining to demeanour and
perceptions of  credibility.118 In light of  the expansive evidence that demeanour is a poor
indicator of  veracity, calls have been made for a mandatory demeanour warning,
particularly in regard to evidence from vulnerable groups.119 The possibility was rejected
by the New Zealand Court of  Appeal in E v R,120 which seemed to prefer the historical
practice for juries being free to evaluate demeanour as an indicator of  credibility over the
weight of  social scientific evidence against it. From our perspective, however, is clear that
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such a mechanism holds the potential to address negative stereotyping in relation to
learning disabled witnesses, particularly when the opportunities for experts to inform
juries is so limited.121
Conclusions 
Non-verbal victims, at least those who are capable of  understanding basic questions and
offering intelligible answers, are now afforded an opportunity not only to have their
voices heard, but also to have those voices considered seriously at both the investigative
and trial stages of  the criminal process. In addition to these developmentally sensitive
adjustments to law, policy and procedure, the courts have exercised considerable juridical
vigour in facilitating the best evidence of  atypical vulnerable witnesses, and the Advocates
Training Council and Judicial College have also been proactive in promoting specialist
education and training.
It is encouraging to see the legal profession demonstrate that it is open to challenging
traditional assumptions about learning disabled witnesses and exhibit an openness
towards reform. These changes will take some time to embed, and challenges still lie
ahead in ‘mainstreaming’ alternatives to oral evidence. But it is anticipated that in the
years ahead more non-verbal victims will feel able to exercise their voice and will receive
appropriate support to convey their message, have the content of  that message carefully
considered, and, subsequently, exert an influence on the decision-making in both the
investigative and trial phases of  the criminal process. It is hoped, and expected, that in
time this will boost reporting and conviction rates, and reduce attrition rates. While this
article has focused on the trial process, some of  the lessons set out here may inform
future approaches concerning participation in other facets of  the criminal process, such
as requesting information about the case or challenging charging decisions. If  this is
accomplished, we are well on the road to establishing a more equal, legitimate and
inclusionary criminal justice system where all witnesses are enabled to participate
irrespective of  their cognitive or developmental capabilities.
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